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 INTRODUCTION 
The creation of appellate jurisdiction is under the purview of Congress 
and subject to constitutional constraints.1  Appellate jurisdiction refers to the 
power of a higher court to review and correct the decisions of an inferior judi-
cial body.2  A first-year law student may assume that appellate procedure is 
commensurate in scope with Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“Federal Rules”), which governs how civil procedures are construed in district 
courts.3  Rule 1 provides that all other Federal Rules should be construed and 
administered  “to  secure  the  just,  speedy,  and  inexpensive  determination  of  every  
action   and   proceeding.”4  Congress codified the establishment of the Federal 
Rules in 1938 to promote these very ends.5  However, the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure offer no analogous rule for construction.6  This does not sug-
gest that the purpose of Rule 1 is unexpressed when Congress acts legislatively. 
Congress established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“Federal  Circuit”)  in  1982 with the goals of Rule 1 in mind.7  The Federal Cir-
cuit is an appellate court having exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the Patent Act.8  The court hears administrative appeals from pa-
tentability decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office as well as appeals of district court 
decisions involving patents.9  Congress anticipated that the court would elimi-
  
1 See U.S. CONST.,   art.   I,   §  8,   cl.   9   (Congress   shall  have   the  power   to   “constitute  Tribunals  
inferior  to   the  supreme  Court.”);;  see also U.S. CONST.,  art.   III,  §  1  (“The  judicial  Power  of  
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress  may  from  time  to  time  ordain  and  establish.”);;  28  U.S.C.  §§ 1291–95 (2010) (set-
ting forth the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals). 
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009). 
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (2010). 
4 Id.  28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) mandates that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation make no 
rules inconsistent with Rule 1. 
5 1 DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.21 (3d ed. 2010). 
6 Fed. R. App. P. 1 (2010). 
7 See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
11 (4th ed. 2007). 
8 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2010); 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2010). 
9 In addition, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the following 
Article I tribunals: U.S. Court of Federal Claims; U.S. Court for Veterans Claims; Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board; U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board; U.S. Boards of Contract Ap-
peals; International Trade Commission.  The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over 
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nate non-uniformity in patent law and expedite the resolution of patent cases. 10  
Since  the  court’s  inception,  patents  have  been  upheld more frequently11 and dis-
trict court decisions have been reviewed more quickly12 than during the pre-
Federal Circuit era—a victory, at least, for expediency.13 
Congress, also with the purpose of advancing the ideals of Rule 1, es-
tablished a different kind of institution in 1968—the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation (“JPML”   or   “Panel”).14  The JPML, although not an appellate 
court, is a multi-judge panel having jurisdiction to aggregate civil actions pend-
ing in federal district courts into a single, transferee district  court   for  “coordi-
nated or consolidated pretrial  proceedings.”15  Congress predicted that the Panel 
would reduce the sprawling and duplicative nature of nationwide litigation in-
  
appeals from the U.S. Court of International Trade and claims arising under the following 
federal laws: Patent Act; Little Tucker Act; Economic Stabilization Act; Emergency Petrole-
um Allocation Act; Energy Policy and Conservation Act; and Natural Gas Policy Act.  Histo-
ry of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/historyofcourt.html (last 
visited May 9, 2011). 
10 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7. 
11 See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives 
on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803,  822  (1988)  (“Between  1982  and  1985,  the  court invali-
dated only forty-four percent of the patents it adjudicated on appeal from trial courts, a 
marked contrast to the old invalidation rate of approximately sixty-six  percent.”). 
12 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certio-
rari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 319-20 (1996) 
(“Those  judges  [at  specialized  courts  such  as  the  Federal  Circuit]  work  more  efficiently  and  
quickly because they do not need to learn the elementary principles of an unfamiliar subject 
for  each  new  case  on  the  docket.”);;  Rochelle  Cooper  Dreyfuss,  The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,  8  (1989)  (“As  a  general  matter,  the  court  
has articulated rules that . . . are easy for the lower courts and the research community to ap-
ply.”). 
13 Because CAFC precedent has made validity more difficult to prove, raising the defense of 
invalidity has become less viable. See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal   Circuit’s   Impact   on   Patent   Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 
87 (2006).  Whether horizontal uniformity has been achieved is questionable.  See Ted 
Siechelman, Myths of Un(Certainty) at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY.  L.A. L. Rev. 1161, 
1165–71.  Siechelman notes that forum shopping is still a significant problem in patent law, 
id. at  1169,  and  that  Federal  Circuit  decisions  are  highly  “panel  dependent,”  id. at 1170. 
14 See, e.g., Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial Panel, Transfer, and Tag-
Along Orders Prior to a Determination of Remand: Procedural and Substantive Problem or 
Effective Judicial Policy?, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 841,   844   (1993)   (“The   goal   of   the   [§  
1407] statute was to improve the administration of justice and the operation of the federal tri-
al  courts.”). 
15 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2010). 
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volving large, multi-state actors.16  As of 2010, the Panel had consolidated a 
total of 349,914 actions, and 266,264 of them, roughly seventy-six percent, were 
terminated at the transferee court.17  The Panel saved these terminated actions 
from being resolved in tandem across transferor forums and thereby accelerated 
the determination of duplicative nationwide litigation, thus furthering the pur-
pose underlying Rule 1.18 
The speediness of litigation that these two institutions realized is cer-
tainly evidence of judicial efficiency.  This Article, however, argues that Con-
gress, in establishing the Federal Circuit and the JPML, has sacrificed the  “just”  
and “inexpensive”  determination  of  “every  action  and  proceeding”   for the sake 
of macro-level judicial economy.19  For example, litigants haled into multidis-
trict   litigation   (“MDL”)   lose   valuable   legal strategy when their case is trans-
ferred to a different circuit’s  district  by  the  JPML,  as  evinced  by   In re Korean 
Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983.20  When faced with an adverse court 
order, displaced litigants are limited to filing an interlocutory appeal to the 
transferee appellate court, waiting until pretrial proceedings conclude for re-
mand, or dismissing their case voluntarily.  The costliness of these limited op-
tions forces most MDL cases into settlement in the transferee forum.21  On the 
other hand,   the   Federal   Circuit’s   jurisprudence   generates   substantial costs for 
patent litigants when patent claims are reviewed de novo, as evinced by Cybor 
Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.22  Patent litigants are denied justice when the 
Federal Circuit fails to articulate the legal principles that underlie its opinions,23 
as evinced by recently overturned patent cases, such as eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange L.L.C.24  Patent appeals are funneled to the Federal Circuit, 
which suffers from the lowest agreement rate based on an analysis of recent 
Supreme Court dispositions.25  These results do not evoke ideals of justice26 and 
cost-effectiveness. 
  
16 See Roberts, supra note 14.  
17 See infra text accompanying note 96. 
18 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (2010). 
19 See id. 
20 See infra notes 147–173 and accompanying text. 
21 JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER A. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 132, 160 (2d ed. 
2010). 
22 See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
23 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1671-75  (2003)  (“The  Federal  Circuit  has  proven  particularly  resistant  to  considering  patent  
policy  in  making  its  decisions.”). 
24 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
25 See infra notes 215–245 and accompanying text. 
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This Article argues that the JPML and Federal Circuit, despite their 
range of differences, can benefit from one another and   remedy   each   other’s  
complex institutional challenges.  The Federal Circuit can eliminate the unfair-
ness in multidistrict litigation practice and can guide multidistrict litigation by 
providing uniform federal precedent.  Multidistrict litigation, which is as proce-
durally complex as it is substantively broad, can enable the Federal Circuit to 
speak on non-patent law and can position the circuit to see more clearly how 
patents affect the overall economy.27  Through these mutual benefits, these insti-
tutions can promote justice and cost-effectiveness for each litigant in every pa-
tent action and every MDL proceeding.  To that end, I propose that Congress 
vest in the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the JPML and 
MDL courts. 
Part I of this Article considers the legislative histories of the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and the codification of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in 
1968.  It examines the historical backdrop that precipitated the creation of the 
JPML and explores the historical landscape that gave rise to the Federal Circuit. 
Part II details the unfairness and costliness in the operations of interloc-
utory review of JPML and MDL orders.  This section argues that JPML trans-
fers override the basic principles that govern in personam jurisdiction.  This 
section further demonstrates that the transfer process violates the Seventh 
Amendment right to trial by jury through the use of statistics that show MDL 
cases are rarely remanded to the transferor forum.  Next, Part II examines why 
interlocutory review of JPML orders is inconsistent with traditional forms of 
appellate mandamus, and it concludes with a discussion of the transitory forum 
loophole that disserves plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation. 
  
26 Most scholars take the view that justice and fairness are independent of one another to some 
degree.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 177 (1986).  Others believe that one is a de-
rivative of the other: at one end, justice  as  fairness  regards  “whatever  happens  through  fair  
procedures  [as]  just;;”  at  the  other,  fairness  as  justice  regards  “no  procedure  [as]  fair  unless  it  
is   likely   to  produce   [an  outcome]   that  meet[s]   some   independent   test  of   justice.”    Id.  My 
view is that justice, in the context of Rule 1, denotes a form of imperfect procedural justice—
fairness of process for each litigant in every case with a need for, but not a guarantee of, a 
fair outcome.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85–87 (1971) (distinguishing between 
“perfect”  and  “imperfect”  procedural  justice);;  Elizabeth  Chamblee  Burch,  CAFA’s  Impact  on  
Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517,  2534  (2008)  (“Because  the  Federal  
Rules of Civil Procedure are reactionary—that is, they were enacted to chase and enforce 
substantive norms—they cannot (out of a concomitant pledge to efficiency and affordability) 
hope  to  assure  a  perfect  outcome.”).     Therefore,   the  aim  of   this  article   is   to  remedy  proce-
dures with an eye toward correcting outcomes. 
27 See Dreyfuss, infra note 51. 
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Part III explores the institutional challenges facing the Federal Circuit, 
despite   its  success   in  “enhancing   the  stature  of   the  patent  system.”28  This sec-
tion begins by analyzing the costs that its de novo standard of review imposes 
on   litigants   and   then   scrutinizes   the   circuit’s dubious use of appellate manda-
mus.  This section concludes by examining the Supreme Court’s  supervision  of  
this judicial experiment and reveals that the Court has overturned the Federal 
Circuit in nearly every aspect of its jurisprudence. 
Finally, Part IV proposes vesting in the Federal Circuit exclusive appel-
late jurisdiction over multidistrict litigation.  It argues that the benefits that the 
JPML and Federal Circuit can provide for each other justify this proposal.  This 
section then examines various reforms proposed by commentators, contrasts 
them with the instant proposal, delineates possible reasons for not implementing 
the instant proposal, and argues why these reasons are unpersuasive. 
I.        A TALE OF TWO LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 
A. Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation 
In the early 1800s, section 734 of the Revised Statutes was the tool for 
handling complex litigation.29  Enacted in 1813, the statute provided a general 
means for consolidation and venue changes: 
[W]henever causes of a like nature, or relative to the same question shall be 
pending before a court of the United States or of the territories thereof, it shall 
be lawful for the court to make such orders and rules concerning proceedings 
therein as may be conformable to the principles and usages belonging to 
courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice, 
and accordingly causes may be consolidated as to the court shall appear rea-
sonable.30 
As society developed and matured, the statute proved to be inadequate.31  Terri-
torial expansion and civil war characterized the attitude of the mid-1800s, which 
was  followed  by  reconstruction  at  the  century’s  end.32  Corporate America grew 
  
28 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 11. 
29 Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 21 [28 U.S.C. § 734] repealed by Judicial Code of 
1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 869. 
30 Id. 
31 See Mike Roberts, supra note 14,  at  845  (“The  pre-Judicial Panel venue approach to com-
plex, coordinated litigation and particularly to repeatedly evolving discovery problems, 
proved  inadequate.”). 
32 See, e.g., Outline of U.S.   History,   Chs.   5,   7,   and   8,   Dep’t   St.   (2005),  
http://infousa.state.gov/government/overview/docs/historytln.pdf. 
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in   the  1920s  under   the  policy  declared  by  President  Calvin  Coolidge   that   “the  
chief  business  of  the  American  people   is  business.”33  During this era, the gov-
ernment left the monopolistic practices of large companies untouched, such as 
those by American Telephone & Telegraph.34  However, as big business grew, 
the   practice   of   “trust-busing,” or breaking up unlawful monopolies, grew in 
kind.35  During   the   ‘30s,   the   government enacted strong laws under the New 
Deal to regulate big business, such as controlling telephone rates and services.36  
World War II quelled the antitrust movement,37 but  by   the  early  ‘60s,  the  legal  
landscape was replete with claims of electric equipment price-fixing.38  Near the 
end of the decade, policy-makers realized that something more than consolida-
tion and venue change was needed to deal with the burdens of nationwide, fac-
tually complex litigation.39 
In an effort to address these concerns, in 1967, Chief Justice Earl War-
ren appointed a Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation for the United 
States District Courts.40  The Coordinating Committee recommended the crea-
  
33 President Calvin Coolidge, The Press Under a Free Government, Address before the Ameri-
can Society of Newspaper Editors Washington, D.C. (Jan. 17, 1925) (transcript available at 
the Calvin Coolidge Memorial Foundation), available at http://www.calvin-
coolidge.org/html/the_press_under_a_free_governm.html. 
34 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD 29 (2001) (“AT&T produced an extraordinary telephone system, linking 85 percent 
of  American  homes  at  the  peak  of  its  monopoly  power  in  1965.”). 
35 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 10. 
36 See Carl I. Wheat, The Regulation of Interstate Telephone Rates, 51 HARV. L. REV. 846, 849 
(1938)   (“[T]he   President   (on   February   26,   1934)   had   recommended   the   subjection   of   all  
phases of communication service, by wire or wireless, to the authority of a single regulatory 
body, and Congress responded by including in the Communications Act of 1934 comprehen-
sive provisions for the regulation of interstate telephone and telegraph rates and practices . . 
.”). 
37 See Willard F. Mueller, Antitrust in a Planned Economy: An Anachronism or an Essential 
Complement?, 9 J. ECON. ISSUES 159,  167  (“As  a  result,  even  though  antitrust  enforcement  
was partially demobilized during World War II, the agencies rebounded strongly at the war's 
end,  and  the  big  cases  went  forward.”). 
38 See Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 69, 748 (1995) (“The  MDL  Act  was  passed  in  1968  in  response  to  the  thou-
sands of electrical equipment price-fixing cases filed in the early 1960s under the federal an-
titrust  laws.”). 
39 See id. 
40 See Phil C. Neal, Multi-District Coordination - the Antecedents of 1407, 14 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 99,  99  (1969)  (“The  Coordinating  Committee  .  .  .  was  created  in  response  to  the  huge  
number of private treble damage actions that were filed in the wake of the Government price-
fixing  cases  against  manufacturers  of  electrical  equipment.”). 
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tion of a judicial means for centralizing pretrial proceedings.41  Responding to 
the Coordinating  Committee’s  suggestions,  Congress  codified 28 U.S.C. § 1407 
in 1968, which provides, in pertinent part, for the operation of JPML transfers: 
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pend-
ing in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for co-
ordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made 
by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation . . . for the convenience of par-
ties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such ac-
tions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before 
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was 
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, howev-
er, That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or 
third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the 
action is remanded.42 
The statute establishes four requirements for an MDL transfer: (1) there 
must be   one   or   more   civil   actions   with   “common   questions   of   fact”   that   are  
pending  in  “different  districts,”  (2)  the  transfer of pending actions must be con-
tingent  upon  “convenience”  for  the  parties,  (3)  transfer must  also  be  at  the  “con-
venience”  of  the  witnesses, and (4) transfer must  “promote  a  just  and  efficient”  
result.  Unless an action is remanded by the Panel or terminated by the parties, 
transferred actions remain under the jurisdiction of the Panel and are subject to 
any variety of changes or declinations, such as severance of cross-claims, coun-
ter claims, and third-party claims.43  The statute further provides that the Panel 
shall consist of seven sitting federal judges, all appointed by the Chief Justice of 
the United States,44 and no two Panel members may be from the same federal 
judicial circuit.45 
B. Hruska Commission 
Commentators characterize the early 1930s through the late 1970s as 
the anti-patent era.46  Patents lost favor with the public during that time as a re-
sult of the antitrust movement.47  The thrust of the anti-patent sentiment was that 
  
41 Id. at 104 (“The  plan  called  for  transferring  all  [nationwide]  cases  involving  the  same  product  
line  to  a  designated  district.”). 
42 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2010). 
43 Id. 
44 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2010). 
45 Id. 
46 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 10. 
47 Id. 
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“the  rights  of  powerful  corporations  had  come  to  dominate   the   interests   of   the  
community.”48  District courts upheld few patents during that era.49  All of the 
circuit  courts  heard  patent  appeals,  but  they  “diverged widely both as to doctrine 
and  basic  attitudes  towards  patents.”50  Across the board, the growing queue in 
the appellate dockets became unmanageable for appellate judges.51  There was a 
need to reduce the pendency of nationwide appeals and harmonize patent law.52 
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 
commonly known as the Hruska Commission after its chairman, Senator Roman 
Hruska,53 was convened in 1973 to assess inefficiencies at the appellate level of 
the federal court system.54  The Commission recommended a new experiment in 
judicial specialization that would work to funnel patent appeals into a single 
circuit.55  Congress adopted the recommendations of the Commission by enact-
ing the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.56  The legislation effectively 
merged the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, which helped form the new Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.57  Codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the legislation granted the new 
circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from, inter alia,  a  “final  decision  of  a  
district  court”  involving  patents  under  28 U.S.C. § 1338.58 
  
48 Id. 
49 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 11. 
50 Id. 
51 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Lecture — What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the 
Supreme Court — and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787,   788   (2010)   (“The   new   court  
would reduce the dockets of the regional circuits, and it could, in theory, do  much  more.”);;  
see also COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND 
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 
(setting forth the final recommendations of the Hruska Commission). 
52 See id. 
53 The Hon. S. Jay Plager, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit: Introduction: The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Cir-
cuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 
39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 855 n.8 (1990). 




58 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1338 (2010). 
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II. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
A.    Overriding Personal Jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction, otherwise known as in personam (“against   the  
person”) jurisdiction, refers to the power of a court to enforce its rulings over 
persons in a suit.59  When a plaintiff files a complaint in court, he consents to the 
jurisdiction of the court in which he files his action.60  Therefore, the usual ques-
tion under a personal jurisdiction analysis is whether a defendant is subject to 
the  court’s  jurisdiction.61  Multidistrict litigation, however, ignores the reasona-
bleness principle underlying personal jurisdiction, which is outlined in Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.62 
Asahi involved a California plaintiff who was injured in a personal mo-
torcycle accident.63  In California court, the injured motorcyclist sued Cheng 
Shin, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle’s tires.64  Seeking indemni-
fication as to any damages that the court might award the motorcyclist, Cheng 
Shin impleaded Asahi, the manufacturer of the tire valves for the plaintiff’s  mo-
torcycle tires.65  Asahi was a Japanese company and had never done any busi-
ness in the State of California.  It never sold its tire valves to Californians, main-
tained no offices or agents in California, and did not advertise its products in 
California.66  Cheng Shin comprised no more than 1.24%  of  Asahi’s  total  sales  
revenue.67   
The Court considered the following five factors in its determination of 
whether or not personal jurisdiction over Asahi was reasonable:  (1)  “the  burden  
on   the   defendant,”   (2)   the   forum   state’s   interest   in   the   dispute,   (3)   the   im-
portance of the chosen forum to the “plaintiff’s  interest  in  obtaining  relief,”  (4)  
the   most   efficient   forum   for   judicial   resolution   of   the   dispute,   and   (5)   “the  
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
  
59 Jurisdiction Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Thomas Reuters Legal iPad Application, 
9th ed., 2009). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
63 Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 102–03 (1987). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 103. 
67 Id. at 106. 
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policies.”68  Balancing these five factors, the United States Supreme Court held 
that   exercising   jurisdiction   would   offend   “traditional   notions   of   fair   play   and  
substantial   justice”   because   the   interests   of   Cheng   Shin   and   California   were  
“slight”  and  Asahi’s  burden  of  having  to  defend  from  California  was  “severe.”69 
In adjudicating transfer decisions, the JPML ostensibly considers the 
following four factors: (1) common questions of fact, (2) convenience of parties, 
(3) convenience of witnesses, and (4) just and efficient conduct.70  However, In 
re West of the Rockies Concrete Pipe Antirust Cases makes it clear that the bur-
dens on local parties who litigate in a distant forum are irrelevant to the Panel. 71  
The  litigants’   inconvenience   is  “offset  by  the  savings  from  and  convenience  of  
coordinated or pretrial proceedings   directed   by   the   transferee   judge.”72  The 
JPML’s   balancing   test   is   not   coextensive   with   a   personal   jurisdiction   analysis  
because it considers only three narrow factors: questions of fact, convenience of 
witnesses, and just and efficient conduct.73  The JPML transfer process overrides 
personal jurisdiction when the exercise of personal jurisdiction is not symmet-
rical between the transferor forum and the transferee forum.  City of St. Paul v. 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. provides a good example of this.74 
In City of St. Paul, the municipality brought suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging that Defendant Harper & Row Pub-
lishers violated, inter alia, the Clayton Act.75  The defendant subsequently 
moved for the JPML to transfer the Minnesota case to the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois, where similar litigation was pending.76  The 
Panel granted the motion and transferred the Minnesota case to Chicago for 
coordinated pretrial proceedings.77  The City of St. Paul then filed motions in 
Minnesota objecting to the JPML transfer order.78  The Minnesota district court 
(the transferor court) dismissed the plaintiff’s motions for lack of jurisdiction: 
  
68 Id. at 113. 
69 Id. at 102–6. 
70 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2010). 




74 City of St. Paul v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 837 (D. Minn. 1968). 
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[T]he entry of [the JPML transfer] order effectively, and quite properly, de-
prived this court of further jurisdiction . . . unless and until the cases are re-
manded . . . by order of the Panel for trial or other disposition. If technically 
such order did not deprive this court for the time being of further jurisdic-
tion[,] in any event as a matter of comity this court will not attempt to exercise 
any jurisdiction. Thus the propriety of maintaining these cases, or either of 
them as class actions will be determined by the court in the Northern District 
of Illinois, as will all motions now pending or later brought . . . .79 
The transferor court declined to re-exercise jurisdiction until the JPML remand-
ed the case.80  This placed a burden on the City of St. Paul, who had no option 
but to litigate pretrial proceedings over 400 miles away in Chicago.81  On the 
other hand, Harper & Row reaped the benefit of litigating its pretrial proceed-
ings at home in Chicago.82 
Imagine that Harper & Row first sought declaratory relief in Chicago to 
establish that it had not violated the Clayton Act.83  A declaratory judgment 
would have enabled Harper & Row to avoid being haled into Minnesota to liti-
gate the issue.84  It is unlikely, however, that an Illinois district court would have 
exercised personal jurisdiction against the City of St. Paul.  Applying the Asahi 
balancing test, a reasonable query by the Illinois district court would have found 
that the burden on the City of St. Paul was great and that Illinois had little inter-
est in an out-of-state   municipality’s   insulated   affairs.85  Thus, Harper & Row 
litigated pretrial proceedings against the municipality in Illinois only because of 
a JPML transfer.  In this way, the JPML process overrides the reasonableness 
principle underlying personal jurisdiction because it enables the transferee court 
to exercise personal jurisdiction against a party when it otherwise cannot.86 
B. No Trial, No Jury 
The  Seventh  Amendment  provides   that  “[i]n suits at common law . . . 
the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved.”87  This right extends to legal claims 
  
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 839. 
81 Id. at 838. 
82 Id. 
83 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2010) (setting forth declaratory judgment). 
84 Id. 
85 See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
86 See In re East of the Rockies Concrete Pipe Antitrust Cases, 302 F. Supp. 244, 254 (J.P.M.L. 
1969)  (Weigel,  J.,  concurring)  (Some  parties  “may  be  forced  to  litigate  in  districts  where  they  
could  not  have  been  sued.”). 
87 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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seeking monetary damages.88  Plaintiffs must demand a trial by jury or else the 
right is waived.89  For MDL litigants,  this  right  is  illusory  because  “the  Panel  is  
reluctant   to   order   a   remand   absent   the   suggestion   of   the   transferee   judge.”90  
Commentators have criticized  the  Panel’s  rule  as  the  “legal  equivalent  of  a  black  
hole  from  which  cases  do  not  emerge.”91  These cases cannot be tried in trans-
feree forum in light of Lexecon, which holds that a transferee court cannot trans-
fer to itself a case for trial. 92 
Statistics reveal that MDL cases are rarely remanded for trial at the 
transferor court.93  The JPML transferred 141,364 actions before September 30, 
2000,94 and of those 141,364 actions, only 9,695 were remanded to their respec-
tive transferor districts.95  By 2010, the Panel transferred a total of 223,085 ac-
tions and only remanded 11,986 to their respective transferor districts.96  While 
this data does not discriminate between settled and unsettled cases, roughly sev-
enty-six percent of all cases were terminated in the transferee forum as of Sep-
tember 30, 2010,97 which is not surprising because most cases are forced into 
settlement there.98 
The chart below plots the cumulative number of actions transferred and 
remanded by the JPML post-Lexecon, from 2001 to 2010.99   The dataset reveals 
  
88 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426–27 (1987). 
89 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) (2010). 
90 R.P.J.P.M.L. 10.3(a) (2010). 
91 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 21, at 153. 
92 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
93 Id; see also In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 170 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1349 (J.P.M.L. 
2001)  (rejecting  the  plaintiffs’  argument  that  “the  way  in  which  [pretrial  litigation]  is  being  
administered  effectively  denies  their  constitutional  right  to  a  jury  trial”). 
94 Statistical Analysis of Multidistrict Litigation 2002, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 




96 Statistical Analysis of Multidistrict Litigation 2010, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION (October 2010), 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigati
on_2010.pdf. 
97 This percentage is the ratio of Total Actions Terminated by Transferee Courts to Total Ac-
tions Subjected to § 1407 Proceedings.  See id. 
98 See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 21. 
99 I  compiled  this  data  from  the  Statistical  Information  page  of  the  JPML’s  website.    See Statis-
tical Information, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/body_statistics.html (last visited March 10, 2011). 
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that the rate at which cases were transferred peaked in 2004, decreased between 
2005 and 2009, and rose sharply after 2009.  The rate at which the JPML re-
manded cases remained relatively stable throughout the selected years despite 
the fluctuation in transfer rates.  Objections that JPML procedures deprive liti-
gants of their Seventh Amendment right to jury trial are particularly persuasive 
in light of these statistics. 
 
The paucity of remanded cases is not necessarily unintentional.100  Judge 
Charles R. Weiner, who presided over tens of thousands of MDL pretrial pro-
ceedings, suggested that he declined to remand cases to the transferor court out 
of concern that these trials   would   “upset   settlement   efforts”   and   “might   force  
some defendants into   bankruptcy,   which   would   hurt   other   plaintiffs.”101  The 
  
100 See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 21, at 152-53. 
101 Id. 
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JPML, in In re Collins, declined to remand punitive damage claims to the trans-
feror forum where the transferee judge had a blanket practice of retaining those 
claims102—a result that the Third Circuit justified on the basis that “continued  
hemorrhaging   of   available   funds”  would   deprive   current   and   future   victims   of  
the   ability   to   receive   “rightful   compensation.”103  For Judge Weiner and the 
JPML, insolvency concerns meant sacrificing individualized justice.104  Today, 
the  JPML’s  own  rules make non-remand default and remand discretionary.105 
Where the transferee district court terminates an action by valid order, includ-
ing but not limited to summary judgment . . . , [t]he terminated action shall 
not be remanded to the transferor court and the transferee court shall retain 
the original files and records unless the transferee judge or the Panel directs 
otherwise.106   
Because the Panel regards retainment as the default, it is not unexpected that 
few MDL cases today see a jury on collateral issues, such as compensatory or 
punitive damages.107 
C. Escaping Appellate Supervision 
Review of JPML orders is set forth under § 1407(e).108  The statute pro-
vides that JPML orders are only reviewable by extraordinary writ of mandamus 
  
102 In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
103 Id. 
104 See supra note 26.  Justice, in the context of Rule 1, requires fair procedures with an eye 
towards a fair outcome.  Depriving a litigant of a jury trial (that would be otherwise available 
to him but for MDL) is a deprivation of procedural justice.  Even if justice only demands fair 
outcomes, a settlement, for example, may hardly be a fair outcome or result in a fair distribu-
tion of damages.  See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class 
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 226 
(2004)  (“[W]hen  the  judicial  system  effectively  holds  defendants  absolutely  liable  by  forcing  
them to settle—regardless of fault or negligence—then defendants have little incentive to 
take  excessive  precautionary  measures.”);;  id.  at  161  (“In  any  type  of  aggregated  mass  tort  lit-
igation, federal judges feel a mounting pressure, be it real or perceived, to efficiently dispose 
of the cases, which encourages them not to question  the  settlement  terms.”);;  JAY TIDMARSH, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1998, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE 
STUDIES 36–45 (1998) (discussing the Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc. settlement in which claims 
from the Consultation fund were divided equally among plaintiffs rather than on the basis of 
each  plaintiff’s  actual  injuries). 
105 R.P.J.P.M.L. 10.1(a) (2010). 
106 Id. (emphasis added). 
107 See id; see also TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 21, at 152-53. 
108 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2010). 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs Act, and only by the court of appeals hav-
ing jurisdiction over the district where a pre-transfer hearing is held (the 
pre-transfer forum) or the district where the actions are aggregated (the transfer-
ee forum).109  In this way, the means by which the courts of appeals review 
JPML decisions is inconsistent with traditional models of appellate manda-
mus,110 which refers to mandamus111 issued by a higher court to compel a lower 
court to take, or refrain from, an action.112  Commentators posit supervisory and 
advisory models as ways to explain the function of appellate mandamus.113 
Under the supervisory model, appellate mandamus serves to correct the 
“established  bad  habits”  of  lower  courts.114  La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. exem-
plifies this theory.115  There, Judge La Buy sua sponte referred certain antitrust 
cases   to  a  special  master  because  his  “court  was  confronted  with  an   extremely  
congested calendar.”116  The Seventh Circuit issued mandamus to compel Judge 
La Buy to vacate his order.117  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.118  In af-
firming  the  Seventh  Circuit,  the  Court  expressed  that  “supervisory  control  of  the  
District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial admin-
  
109 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407(e), 1651 (2010); see also In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“Petitioners  have  satisfied  the  first  condition  to  mandamus  in  that   they  have no other ade-
quate means to attain relief from the JPML's order refusing to remand their cases. Mandamus 
is   the   sole  means   through  which  petitioners   can   seek   review  of   the   JPML’s  order.”)     This  
contrasts with § 1406(a) venue transfers, which are interlocutory orders subject to review by 
mandamus and final judgment.  See Brent E. Johnson, Federal Venue under Section 1392(a): 
The Problem of the Multidistrict Defendant, 85 MICH. L. REV. 352,  352  n.6  (1986)  (“The  re-
sult is that, barring recourse to the extraordinary writ of mandamus, a disgruntled defendant 
will  have  to  wait  for  a  final  judgment  before  taking  an  appeal  on  the  venue  issue.”). 
110 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus 9–18 (Univ. of Fla. Levin College of 
Law Research, Working Paper No. 2011-06), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734419. 
111 Mandamus  literally  means  “we  command”  and  is  one  of  the  extraordinary  writs  in  the  com-
mon law.  Mandamus Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mandamus (last visited April 1, 2010). 
112 See 28  U.S.C.  §  1651(a)  (2010)  (“The  Supreme  Court  and  all  courts  established  by  Act  of  
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions 
and agreeable to the usage and principles of law.”). 
113 See Gugliuzza, supra note 110. 
114 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3934.1 (2d ed. 
2010). 
115 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). 
116 Id. at 253. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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istration  in  the  federal  system.”119  In  the  Court’s  view,  mandamus  served  a  cor-
rective function.120 
Under the advisory model, appellate mandamus is issued to address 
novel issues of law.121  Schlagenhauf v. Holder exemplifies this theory.122  In this 
case, Judge Holder ordered Schlagenhauf to submit to mental and physical ex-
aminations under Federal Rule 35.123  Schlagenhauf sought mandamus to have 
the order set aside.124  The Seventh Circuit recognized that the issue was one of 
first impression in the federal courts, carefully reviewed the merits of 
Schlagenhauf’s  petition,  but   reached  an  adverse  decision.125  On certiorari, the 
Supreme   Court   validated   the   use   of   mandamus   to   review   “basic,   undecided 
question[s]”  of  law  by  courts of appeals.126  However, the Court disagreed with 
the  Seventh  Circuit’s  interpretation  of  Federal  Rule  35  and  remanded  the  case  to  
the district court.127  Nevertheless, mandamus served an advisory function.128 
The circuits exercise mandamus authority over the JPML in a way that 
neither conforms to the supervisory or advisory model.  The Panel lacks effec-
tive supervision because the Panel has more than one supervisor at almost any 
given time; each supervisor is equal; each supervisor makes his own rules (alt-
hough two or more supervisors may make the same rule); and no supervisor 
coordinates with another supervisor.  Advice issued to the Panel is persuasive at 
best because the Panel has thirteen advisors; each advisor is equal; all advice 
carries equal weight; each advisor holds his own opinion (although two or more 
advisors may share the same opinion); and no two advisors offer advice on the 
same issue within a reasonable period of time. 
The courts of appeals exercise mandamus power over the JPML under a 
unique scheme that I call “time-splitting  mandamus.”  In this way, the thirteen 
circuits split authority based on the temporal stage of one or more MDL pro-
ceedings.  Examining a single MDL proceeding, one pre-transfer circuit exer-
cises mandamus authority when the Panel aggregates actions for a pre-transfer 
hearing from transferor fora residing in one or more transferor circuits.  Authori-
  
119 Id. at 259–60. 
120 Id; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 110. 
121 Id. 
122 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). 
123 Id. at 108. 
124 Id. at 109. 
125 Id. at 111. 
126 Id. at 110. 
127 Id. at 122. 
128 See Gugliuzza, supra note 110. 
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ty then splits time–wise on transfer—the pre-transfer circuit loses mandamus 
authority and one transferee circuit gains authority unless the transferee circuit 
is the pre-transfer circuit.  The transferee circuit retains mandamus authority, 
notwithstanding remand to a transferor forum in a transferor circuit.129  Outside a 
single MDL proceeding, however, there is other ongoing multidistrict litigation, 
and when viewed from this perspective, mandamus is split among two or more 
circuits at any give time. 
Appellate mandamus issued to the JPML under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) is a 
unique form of mandamus unto itself.130  It serves to correct the outcome of a 
particular transfer or remand decision and does not advise or supervise the Pan-
el.  The JPML effectively eludes guidance by the appellate courts, in part, be-
cause of the unique time-splitting scheme under which the circuits review JPML 
decisions. 
D. The Transitory Forum Loophole 
As master of the complaint, a plaintiff is entitled to choose his forum, 
which governs the law of pretrial proceedings.  The  “interest   in  preserving   the  
plaintiff’s  choice  of  forum  includes  not  only  the  court  that  will  conduct  the  trial  
but the appellate court  as  well.”131  A  plaintiff  “who  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  
litigating in a circuit whose precedent supports [his] theory of the case might 
omit a [particular federal] claim in order to avoid review by a [different] Cir-
cuit.”132  Thus, the complaint  also  “governs  appellate  jurisdiction.”133  However, 
a JPML transfer enables a defendant to avail   himself   of   a   transferee   forum’s  
disharmonious law to obtain a favorable ruling during pretrial proceedings that 
he could not obtain after pretrial concludes—a  result  that  I  label  as  the  “transito-
ry   forum   loophole.”134  The unfairness of this loophole manifests itself in pre- 
and post-transfer contexts.  Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Ser-
  
129 See In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act Effective Scheduling Litig., 73 F.3d 528, 
533  (4th  Cir.  1996)  (“[T]he  Panel  is  directed  to retransfer from the District of South Carolina, 
the Northern District of Florida, and the Eastern District of Tennessee to the Eastern District 
of North Carolina those claims that were dismissed by Judge Fox prior to the June 20, 1994, 
remand by the Panel.”). 
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2010). 
131 Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
132 Id. 
133 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 1071. 
134 See infra text accompanying notes 137–158. 
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vice135 exemplifies the unfairness of interlocutory review of pre-JPML transfer 
issues, and In re Korean Air Lines136 exemplifies the unfairness of interlocutory 
review concerning post-JPML transfer issues. 
1. Interlocutory Review of Pre-JPML Transfer Issues 
In Astarte v. Allied, the Southern District of New York granted Allied 
an attachment order under maritime law and held Astarte’s  property  in abeyance 
until the suit could be resolved.137  The JPML subsequently transferred the case 
to the Eastern District of Louisiana.  Astarte appealed the attachment order to 
the Second Circuit (the transferor circuit),138 and the Second Circuit dismissed 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  Astarte then appealed to the Fifth Circuit (the 
transferee circuit).139 
In addressing the issue of appellate jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit held 
that  “[t]he  review  of  any  order  of   the  district  court   in  a   transferred  case,  made  
before transfer, is within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the circuit to 
which  the  case  has  been  transferred.”140  The court reasoned that a JPML order 
“transfers  [an]  action  lock,  stock,  and  barrel.”141  This meant that no part of the 
lawsuit remained in the transferor forum, and a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 
deprived all courts of the transferor forum of jurisdiction.142  Turning  to  Allied’s  
substantive argument, the court concluded that the attachment order was proper 
under Fifth Circuit precedent and then denied Astarte’s  appeal.143 
Astarte was wrongly decided because the court only looked to its own 
maritime precedent.144  The court failed to consider any Second Circuit prece-
dent when deciding the correctness of the attachment order, even though it was 
ordered under the laws of the Second Circuit prior to transfer.145  In this way, 
  
135 Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Exp. Serv., 767 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1985). 
136 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 






143 Id. at 88. 
144 See id. (relying on Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoning Sailing Vessel, 
640 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1981) and Constructora Subacuatica Diavaz v. M/V HIRYU, 718 F.2d 
690 (5th Cir.1983)). 
145 Id. 
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Astarte allowed defendants (appellees) to unfairly benefit from the transitory 
forum loophole.146 
2. Interlocutory Review of Post-JPML Transfer Issues 
In re Korean Air Lines exemplifies the unfairness that emanates from 
interlocutory review of post-JPML transfer issues.147  On September 1, 1983, 
Korean Air Lines Flight 007, en route to New York City from Seoul, strayed 
into restricted Soviet airspace as a result of pilot error.148  Mistaking the Korean 
airliner for a U.S. spy plane, the Soviet military shot down the aircraft, killing 
all 269 passengers aboard.149  Plaintiffs, on behalf of the deceased, filed wrong-
ful death actions in federal district courts that were within the jurisdictions of 
the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits.150  They sought damages in excess of 
$75,000 per victim.151  The JPML transferred these cases for pretrial proceedings 
to the District Court for the District of Columbia.152 
The salient issue before the district court was whether the Warsaw Con-
vention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, capped damages at $75,000 
per passenger if passengers were issued defective tickets.153  There was no dam-
ages ceiling under Second Circuit precedent, and the First and Sixth Circuits 
were essentially silent on the issue.154  On interlocutory appeal, the District of 
Columbia Circuit followed its own precedent, which held that a defective ticket 
did not frustrate the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agree-
ment, and its stipulated price of $75,000 per casualty.155  The District of Colum-
bia Circuit reasoned that the law of the transferor forum on federal questions 
“does  not  have  stare decisis effect in the transferee forum” even though a case is 
to be remanded to the transferor forum at the conclusion of pretrial proceed-
ings.156  Damages were thus capped at $75,000 per plaintiff.157 
  
146 See id. 
147 In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
148 Id. at 1172. 
149 Korean Air Lines Flight 007, WIKIPEDIA (May 14, 2011 9:21), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Lines_Flight_007. 




154 Id. at 1175. 
155 Id. at 1176. 
156 Id. 
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A switch in circuits meant a markedly different outcome for the plain-
tiffs who filed suit in the Second Circuit.158  This was in part because the federal 
laws of the two fora were non-uniform.  It was no help that the multidistrict 
litigation statute was silent on whether transferor law applied in the transferee 
forum.159  In 1972, the Panel suggested that the federal law of the transferor fo-
rum would always apply after a 28 U.S.C. § 1407 transfer, but the Panel backed 
away from that position in 1988, claiming that  “it  is  not  the  business  of  the  Pan-
el  to  consider  what  law  the  transferee  court  might  apply.”160  One practical effect 
is that plaintiffs who are haled into multidistrict litigation incur substantial ex-
pense when they are subject to, and must litigate according to, the federal laws 
of two fora in one legal proceeding—especially when the interpretations of 
those laws vary.161 
Congress did not contemplate the transitory forum loophole when it es-
tablished the JPML.162  The history of the JPML reveals that Congress narrowly 
established the institution to solve the evolving difficulties in duplicative, na-
tionwide antitrust litigation, such as claims of electronic price-fixing.163  This 
type of litigation concerns complex factual issues and entails extensive pretrial 
proceedings, such as depositions of industry experts and corporate executives, 
motions in limine concerning the evaluation of complex economic evidence, and 
production of numerous privileged documents.164  It is the duplicativeness of 
these pretrial proceedings that Congress sought to reduce.165 
The D.C. Circuit incorrectly inferred Congress’s purpose for creating 
the JPML when it decided In re Korean Air Lines.166  The circuit premised its 
holding on its assumption  that  the  “law  of  the  case”  must  govern  in the transfer-
or  forum  or  else  transfer  under  §  1407  would  be  “counterproductive; i.e., capa-
ble of generating rather than reducing the duplication and protection Congress 
  
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 1180. 
159 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2010). 
160 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 21, at 160 (internal citations omitted). 
161 See id; see also infra note 173. 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 34–39. 
163 Id. 
164 See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Write, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judg-
es? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals 1–3 (George Mason 
Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 09-07), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319888. 
165 See supra notes 34–39. 
166 In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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sought  to  check.”167  But as the JPML’s  history  suggests,  Congress’s  intention  to  
eliminate duplication did not mean that Congress intended to eliminate ap-
peals.168  Furthermore,   the   circuit’s   reference   to the   “law   of   the   case”   doctrine  
was a poor attempt to save an otherwise counterproductive holding.169  The law 
of the case doctrine is a discretionary “rule  of  practice,  based  on  sound  policy  
that, when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the 
matter.”170  The   doctrine,   however,   “does   not   limit   a   court’s   power,”171 and 
“judges of coordinate jurisdiction are not bound by each others’ rulings, but are 
free   to   disregard   them   if   they   so   choose.”172  As such, when transferee law is 
more  advantageous  to  a  defendant,  the  D.C.  Circuit’s  holding  is  unlikely  to  dis-
courage a plaintiff from waiting until pretrial proceedings conclude to appeal an 
adverse trial court decision.173  Conversely, when transferor law is more advan-
tageous to a plaintiff, a defendant has incentive to prolong pretrial proceedings, 
such as through interlocutory appeal, to force a financially distressed plaintiff 
into settlement.174  For those reasons, In re Korean Air Lines serves to increase 
the overall costs of litigation and illuminate the unfairness of the transitory fo-
rum loophole that 28 U.S.C. § 1407 created.175 
III.         THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
A.    An Expensive Standard of Review 
When appellate courts review the decisions of a trial court,176 they gen-
erally  give  substantial  deference  to  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  and  no  def-
  
167 Id. at 1176. 
168 See Ragazzo, supra note 38,  at  748  (“Sparse  legislative  history  suggests  that  Congress  gave  
little  consideration  to  the  choice  of  law  problem  [in  MDL  appeals].”). 
169 In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176. 
170 Pincus v. Pabst Brewing Co., 752 F. Supp. 871, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (internal citations 
omitted). 
171 Castro v. U.S., 124 S. Ct. 786, 789 (U.S. 2003). 
172 United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1982). 
173 See, e.g., Aaron Bayer, MDL Appeals, 27 NAT’L L. J. 43, 2 (2005) (advising practitioners 
engaged in multidistrict litigation to wait until remand to appeal); Mark A. Chavez, The MDL 
Process, 1656 PLI/CORP. 117,  137  (2008)  (warning  that  “different  laws  are  applied  on  appeal  
of the same decision by the MDL court, and litigants should carefully consider when and 
where  to  appeal  adverse  MDL  court  rulings.”). 
174 See id. 
175 Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2010). 
176 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 (2010). 
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erence  to  the  court’s  legal  conclusions.177  Questions of law are reviewed de no-
vo, meaning  “anew.”178  Problems arise when issues involve mixed questions of 
law and fact.179 
One can see how patent claim construction presents mixed issues of law 
and fact.180  Patent claims, which are set forth in an issued patent, demarcate the 
metes and bounds of protection for a patented invention.181  Claim construction 
refers  to  the  court’s  interpretation  of  the  words  in  the  patent  claims.182  Words of 
a claim “are   generally   given   their   ordinary and customary meaning.”183 This 
means that the words are prescribed the meaning that they would have to “a 
person  of  ordinary  skill  in  the  art”  at  the  time  of  the  patentee’s  invention.184  In 
determining that meaning, a skilled person must look   to   “the   words   of   the  
claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, 
and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of 
technical  terms,  and  the  state  of  the  art.”185 
Although many circuits treat hybrid questions as matters of fact and 
give substantial deference to the trial court,186 the Federal Circuit follows a path 
of pure de novo review with respect to patent claim construction.187  The Su-
preme Court, in Markman II,188 observed   that  claim  construction   is  a  “mongrel 
practice,”   but   the   Court   affirmed   the   Federal   Circuit’s   pragmatic decision to 
treat it as a matter of law, better suited to the determination of judges, rather 
  
177 See infra text accompanying note 203. 
178 De Novo Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Thomas Reuters Legal iPad Application, 
9th ed., 2009). 
179 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7,  at  847  (“Conflicts  over  Mixed  Questions  of  Law  and  
Fact”). 
180 See id. 
181 35  U.S.C.  §  112  (2010)  (“The  specification  shall  conclude  with  one  or  more  claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”). 
182 See, e.g., Markman  v.  Westview  Instruments,  Inc.,  517  U.S.  370,  372  (1996)  (“We  hold  that  
the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claims, is exclusively within the 
province  of  the  court.”). 
183 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
184 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
185 Innova v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
186 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7,  at  847  (“Conflicts  over  Mixed  Questions  of  Law  and  
Fact”). 
187 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter Markman I].  
188 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter Markman II]. 
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than juries.189  Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc. plainly established that 
claim construction is subject to de novo review on appeal.190  These cases illus-
trate that de novo review of claim construction is not inexpensive to the deter-
mination of patent cases. 
In the case of Cybor, FAS,  the  patentee,  claimed  that  Cybor’s  products  
infringed its patented pump for applying liquid onto semiconductor wafers.191  
During a Markman hearing, FAS introduced experts well-versed in the art of 
fluid dynamics to testify on the meaning of the patent claims.192  The district 
court relied on the expert testimony in construing the claim terms.193  The jury, 
without having weighed the credibility of the experts, found  that  Cybor’s  prod-
ucts   infringed  FAS’s  patent  based  on   the  meaning  of   the  claim  terms  as  deter-
mined by the trial judge.194 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit recognized that the trial court had unfet-
tered authority to weigh the expert testimony without submitting its credibility 
to the jury.195  Similarly, the circuit recognized that it had unfettered review of 
the   trial   court’s   claim   construction,   “including any allegedly fact-based ques-
tions relating to claim construction.”196  The circuit then proceeded to construe 
the patent claims anew,197 affording no weight to FAS’s  experts or to the lower 
court’s   interpretation  of   the  patent  claims.198  Based on its own construction, it 
affirmed that FAS’s  patent  was  valid  and  was  infringed.199 
That patent claim construction—an arguably factually intensive en-
deavor for a skilled artisan—is a matter of law imposes considerable expenses 
on patent litigation.  Parties have incentive to put on numerous expert witnesses 
at a Markman hearing to persuade a trial judge who generally lacks a technical 
background to adopt a particular claim construction.  The Federal Circuit, how-
ever, has no obligation to accept expert testimony (and in many cases ignores or 
  
189 See Markman  II,  517  U.S.  at  388  (“So  it  turns  out  here,  for  judges,  not  juries,  are  the  better  
suited  to  find  the  acquired  meaning  of  patent  terms.”). 
190 See Cybor Corp v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding 
that  “claim  construction,  as  a  purely  legal  issue,  is  subject  to  de novo review  on  appeal”). 
191 Id. at 1453. 
192 Id. at 1471. 
193 Id. at 1455–56. 
194 Id. at 1453. 
195 Id. at 1455–56. 
196 Id. at 1456. 
197 Id. at 1458. 
198 Id. at 1458–60. 
199 Id. 
File: Nofal - Final - Post Proof - NEW 12.27 Created on: 12/3/2012 8:53:00 PM Last Printed: 12/29/2012 5:46:00 PM 
 How the JPML Can Benefit 403 
  Volume 52 — Number 3 
rejects it).200  This in turn fosters appeals that present highly factual arguments, 
which parties may not file until after a final judgment because the Federal Cir-
cuit refuses to review claim construction on interlocutory appeal—
notwithstanding that claim construction is central (and oftentimes necessary) to 
evaluating validity and infringement.201  This regime whereby questions of so-
phisticated fact are afforded no deference hardly evokes the inexpensive deter-
mination of patent cases. 
Post-Cybor,  there  has  been  much  debate  about  the  Federal  Circuit’s  de 
novo standard of review.202  In Phillips v. AWH Corp., Judges Mayer expressed 
marked concern in his dissent: 
While this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction is a purely 
legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is plainly not the case.  
Claim construction is, or should be, made in context: a claim should be inter-
preted both from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art and in view 
of the state of the art at the time of invention . . . . We simply must follow the 
example of every other appellate court, which, regarding the vast majority of 
factual questions, reviews the trial court for clear error . . . . Therefore, not on-
ly is it more efficient for the trial court to construct the record, the trial court is 
better, that is, more accurate, by way of both position and practice, at finding 
facts than appellate judges.203 
Despite these concerns, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court re-
fuse to revisit Markman or Cybor.204  The  reason  for  the  Supreme  Court’s  refusal  
is relatively clear: the Court defers to the specialized nature of the Federal Cir-
cuit on how to review hybrid issues.205  The  Federal  Circuit’s   reasoning   is   less 
than clear.  Looking at statistics, the Federal Circuit reversed over thirty-three 
  
200 See, e.g., Markman  I,  52  F.3d  at  983  (“Thus,  to   the  extent   they  were  testifying  about  con-
struction  itself,  we  reject  Markman's  and  Markman’s  patent  expert's  testimony  as  having any 
controlling effect on what the court below and we perceive to be the meaning of 'inventory' 
as  used  in  the  patent  and  prosecution  history.”);; John P. Sutton, Should the Federal Circuit 
Defer to Findings of Fact by Tribunals Below It?, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 701, 
710  (2007)  (“Instead  of  deferring  to  the  district  court  in  its  expert-assisted claim construction, 
the Federal Circuit has adopted a policy of  excluding  expert  evidence  .  .  .  .”). 
201 See Kyle J. Fiet, Restoring the Promise of Markman: Interlocutory Patent Appeals Reevalu-
ated Post-Phillips v. AWH Corp., 84 N.C. L. REV. 1291, 1321 (noting that the Federal Cir-
cuit  “has  thus  far  exercised  its  discretion  and  refused  all  such  interlocutory  claim  construc-
tion  appeals”). 
202 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7,  at  847  (“Controversy  of  Cybor”). 
203 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332–34 (2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
204 See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7,   at  847   (“Controversy   of  Cybor”); Cybor Corp, 
138 F.3d at 1450; Markman II, 517 U.S. at 388. 
205 See supra note 99. 
File: Nofal - Final - Post Proof - NEW 12.27 Created on:  12/3/2012 8:53:00 PM Last Printed: 12/29/2012 5:46:00 PM 
404 IDEA—The Intellectual Property Law Review  
52 IDEA 3 (2012) 
percent of district court claim constructions in 2001 on de novo review.206  One 
can guess that the court values whatever uniformity de novo review provides 
over the expenses that patent litigants incur. 
B. Selective Mandamus 
The Federal Circuit has an unorthodox mandamus practice.207  It was not 
until 2008 that the circuit issued its first mandamus decision in the case of In re 
TS Tech Corp.208  In that case, Lear sued TS Tech for patent infringement in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.209  TS Tech subsequently 
moved to transfer the case to the Southern District of Ohio.  The district court 
denied   TS  Tech’s   motion,   and   TS   Tech   petitioned   for   mandamus,   which   the  
Federal Circuit granted.210 
Since TS Tech, the Federal Circuit granted mandamus disproportionate-
ly in cases where parties sought to transfer cases away from the Eastern District 
of Texas and denied petitions disproportionately to transfer cases to the Eastern 
District of Texas.211  Commentators  suggest  that  the  Federal  Circuit’s  aggressive  
review of Eastern District transfers is motivated by the perception that the East-
ern  District  has  a  “poor  reputation  among  patent-infringement  defendants”  or  by  
disappointment   that   the   district   has   tried   “to   make   itself   a   judicial   center   for  
patent   ligation.”212  Nevertheless, these reasons are inconsistent with the tradi-
tional roles of mandamus; i.e., supervision and advice.213  The Federal Circuit is 
not correcting the bad behavior of the Eastern District nor is the circuit advising 
the district on novel legal issues.214  One explanation for the  Federal  Circuit’s  
selective use of mandamus is that the court is avoiding the messy legal and poli-
cy issues of its jurisprudence that Eastern District has illuminated.  Nonetheless, 
the  circuit’s  selectivity  unfairly  burdens  parties where the proper venue should 
be Eastern Texas. 
  
206 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) (finding that the Federal Circuit reversed thirty-three per-
cent of district court claims constructions). 
207 See Gugliuzza, supra note 110, at 36–40. 
208 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 See Gugliuzza, supra note 110, at 42–47. 
212 Id. at 50. 
213 Id. at 15–18. 
214 Id. 
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C. The Lowest Agreement Rate 
The Supreme Court overturned nearly every aspect of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s   jurisprudence  since   its   inception.    The  Court  overturned  the  Federal  Cir-
cuit’s  rigid obviousness doctrine in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.;215 its 
bright-line test for prosecution history estoppel in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.;216 its limited application of patent exhaustion in 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.;217 its doctrine of equivalents in 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.;218 its licensing jurispru-
dence in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.;219 its limited safe harbor exemp-
tion for research activity in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.;220 and its 
bright-line test for injunctive relief in eBay.221 
An empirical analysis of the last decade of United States Supreme Court 
dispositions reveals that the Court reversed the decisions of this judicial experi-
ment more than any other federal appellate court.222  Although this may not be 
the best comparison because the Federal Circuit is almost never party to a cir-
cuit-split, it provides support for one conclusion that the circuit is more error-
prone than regional circuits.  Even if we compare the number of times the Su-
preme Court agreed with each regional circuit based on circuit splits vis-à-vis 
the number of times the Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit alone, 
the data reveals that the Supreme Court has agreed with the Federal Circuit less 
than any regional circuit.223 
One  explanation  for   the  Federal  Circuit’s   lowest  agreement  rate   is   that 
the circuit reviews the majority of its cases much differently than regional cir-
cuits review the majority of their cases.  The Federal Circuit has adopted a de 
  
215 KSR  Int’l  Co.  v.  Teleflex  Inc.,  550  U.S.  398,  415 (2007). 
216 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
217 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
218 Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
219 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
220 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
221 eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
222 See Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
3 LANDSLIDE 2, (2010) (giving  the  Federal  Circuit  the  lowest  grade  of  ‘D’). 
223 Between 2005 and 2008, the Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit twice, whereas 
the Court agreed with each regional circuit at least twenty-one times based on circuit splits.  
Compare Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split 
Resolutions, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1145, 1165 (2011) with Hofer, supra note 222. 
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novo standard when reviewing most patent issues,224 and patents constitute a 
majority  of  the  Federal  Circuit’s  docket.225  If other circuits were to review the 
majority of appellate issues de novo, then the statistics may be more favorable to 
the Federal Circuit.  Moreover, patent appeals, unlike general appeals, are not 
distributed among the regional circuits,226 making it rare for the Federal Circuit 
to compare and borrow precedent from other circuits and impossible to wait 
around for the Supreme Court to speak on   another   circuit’s   interpretation   of  
patent law.227  Thus, the Federal Circuit may suffer from an intrinsic disad-
vantage when its agreement rate is measured vis-à-vis the regional circuits. 
Nonetheless, these statistics reveal something about the Federal Circuit 
as an institution.  The circuit adopted the precedent of its predecessor, the Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which did not have jurisdiction over 
district court patent cases.228  The  CCPA’s   jurisprudence  concerned  appeals  of  
administrative decisions from the USPTO and comprised bright-line rules.229  
The Federal Circuit, however, built on CCPA precedent in the litigation con-
  
224 See, e.g., In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Clevenger, J.) ("[T]his court 
reviews an obviousness determination . . . de novo . . . .") (citation omitted); Durel Corp. v. 
Osram  Sylvania   Inc.,   256   F.3d  1298,  1307   (Fed.  Cir.   2001);;   (“Enablement is ultimately a 
question of law which this court reviews de  novo.”);; LaBounty Mfg. Inc. v. United States 
Int'l  Trade  Comm'n,  867  F.2d  1572,  1576  (“Prosecution  history  estoppel   is  a  legal  question  
that  is  subject  to  de  novo  review  by  this  court.”);;  Cybor Corp, 138 F.3d at 1450 (Patent claim 
construction is reviewed de novo.); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associ-
ates, 904 F.2d 677, 683–84   (“Whether   an  asserted   scope  of   equivalents  would  impinge  on  
prior art is an issue of law that we review  de  novo.”);;  Riverwood  Int'l  Corp.  v.  R.A.  Jones  &  
Co., Inc., 324 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("This court reviews de novo the legal ques-
tion  of  what  qualifies  as  prior  art….");;  Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 
1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   opinion   amended   on   reh’g,   204   F.3d   1359   (Fed.   Cir.   2000)  
(“Double  patenting   is   a  question  of   law,  which  we   review  de  novo.”);;  Power-One, Inc. v. 
Artesyn  Technologies,  Inc.,  599  F.3d  1343,  1350  (Fed.  Cir.  2010)  (“A  determination  of   in-
definiteness is reviewed  de  novo.”);;  McNulty  v.  Taser  Int'l,   Inc.,  106  F.  App'x  15,  20  (Fed.  
Cir. 2004) (Whether element of patent claim is means-plus-function claim is question of law, 
reviewed de novo.). 
225 Dreyfuss, supra note 51,  at  795  (“[D]espite  congressional  attempts  to  give  the  Federal  Circuit  
cases  outside  patent  law,  patents  remain  at  the  core  of  its  docket.”). 
226 But see Holmes Group, 585 U.S. at 826 (2002) (holding that regional appellate courts can 
hear cases where patent claims arose solely as counterclaims). 
227 See id. 
228 See Gugliuzza, supra note 110, at 21–22. 
229 Id. 
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text.230  It is not a surprise that each of the above reversals arose out of patent 
litigation rather than administrative review.231 
The  CCPA’s  bright-line rules pervaded peripheral areas of patent law, 
such as injunctive relief.232  Over time, the Federal Circuit adopted a presump-
tive approach to granting patentees injunctions without articulating innovation 
policy.233  Permanent injunctions were the norm if patent infringement was 
shown.234  In contrast, the regional circuits applied an equitable test before grant-
ing permanent injunctions.235  The regional circuits required a movant to estab-
lish  that  (1)  it  suffered  an  “irreparable  injury,”  (2)  it  had  “no  adequate  remedy  at  
law,”  (3)  an   equitable  remedy  was  warranted  after  “considering the balance of 
hardships”  of  the  parties,  and  (4)  a  permanent   injunction  served  the  “public   in-
terest.”236  The Supreme Court vacated the Federal  Circuit’s  bright-line test for 
injunctive relief in eBay and admonished the circuit for  failing  to  “reconcile  its  
jurisprudence  with  a  wider  range  of  decisional  law.”237 
The specialized nature of the Federal Circuit isolates it from the other 
courts of appeals, and the effects of the Federal  Circuit’s   isolation  are evident.  
Most significantly, the opinion writer fails to articulate the innovation policy 
that underlies the   court’s   holdings.238  The opinions cite intellectual property 
scholarship four times less frequently than other circuits do in intellectual prop-
erty cases,239 and the opinions suffer from a myopic view of how patents affect 
the overall economy.240  On the other hand, the Supreme Court does not suffer 
from this legal nearsightedness.241  With its generalist docket, it can see when 
  
230 Id. 
231 See supra notes 215–221. 
232 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. 




237 Craig A. Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking  Patent  Law’s  Uniformity  Principle, 101 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1619, 1639–40 (2007). 
238 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 23. 
239 Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in 
Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 667, 676-83 (2002) (providing 
empirical research that demonstrates the other circuits cite scholarship in intellectual property 
cases roughly four times more frequently than does the Federal Circuit in its patent cases.). 
240 See Dreyfuss, supra note 51,  at  800  (“[T]he  Federal  Circuit  is  not  well-positioned to think 
about how patents fit into the overall economy or to see when patent doctrine has deviated 
from  general  rules  of  law.”). 
241 Id. at 795 (discussing the micro and macro level perspective of the Supreme Court). 
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too  much  protection   stifles   the   “Progress  of  Science   and  useful  Arts,”   such  as  
when permanent injunctions issue automatically upon a ruling of patent in-
fringement.242 
The Federal Circuit, however, is not blind to the effects of its isolation.  
In the words of Former Chief Judge Michel: 
We just keep replicating the old results based on the old precedents, whether 
they have kept pace with changes in business, changes in technology, or 
changes of a different sort . . . . [W]e just get the Federal Circuit talking to it-
self, with the brief writer just being the echo of what we wrote in all those pri-
or cases.  And then we write some more cases, and the cycle just goes on and 
on and on.243 
Unfortunately, the court espouses a lofty, formalistic approach with its opin-
ions.244  This approach is antithetical to the concept of individualized justice 
because it fails to perceive how judicial rulings affect innovation, society, or the 
parties to a suit.245 
IV. A STALKING HORSE PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
While the impact of this proposed reform remains speculative, it pro-
vides the starting point for stimulating a discussion about problems and possible 
resolutions for the Federal circuit, the JPML, and MDL courts.  Ideally, refine-
ment will present a consensus solution on how best to deal with the transitory 
forum loophole, the lack of meaningful review of JPML transfer and remand 
decisions, the expensive determination of patent cases, the selectivity of the 
Federal   Circuit’s mandamus practice, and the dearth of innovation policy in 
patent law.  This Article proposes ideas that attempt to collectively solve these 
problems while promoting justice and the inexpensive determination of all legal 
actions and proceedings. 
  
242 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; see eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
243 Hon. Paul Michel, Keynote Presentation, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Confer-
ence on Patent System Reform, Mar. 1, 2002 (transcribed by Gerald T. Peters), posted to In-
ternet Patent News Service, patnews@patenting-art.com (Greg Aharonian ed., Aug. 1, 2002). 
244 Id. 
245 See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Forward:  Constitutions  and  Capabilities:  “Perception”  
Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 5, 24–33 (2007)  (arguing  that  “lofty  formalism”  
is  antithetical  to  the  Capabilities  Approach).    “Perception”  requires  Aristotelian,  “sympathet-
ic  understanding”  of  human  matters.    Id. Without perception, it seems impossible to cognize 
what procedural justice requires. 
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A.   Capturing Mutual Benefit 
Much like The Odd Couple, the Federal Circuit and JPML can benefit 
each other in various ways.  The Federal Circuit can draw on its successful uni-
fication of patent law to harmonize MDL jurisprudence, and harmonizing MDL 
jurisprudence can enable the Federal Circuit to speak on issues outside its patent 
law jurisprudence.  The Federal Circuit can provide needed supervision over the 
JPML, and JPML mandamus jurisprudence can provide a model for the Federal 
Circuit for broadening its selective use of mandamus.  To those ends, this Arti-
cle proposes that these mutual benefits be instated by vesting in the Federal Cir-
cuit exclusive jurisdiction over both pre- and post-JPML transfer orders.  This 
requires modifying § 1407(e) and § 1295 to provide the Federal Circuit exclu-
sive appellate jurisdiction over JPML transfer and remand orders, their denials, 
and all subsequent orders.246 
1. Closing the Transitory Forum Loophole 
The root of the transitory forum loophole is the disharmonious interpre-
tation of federal law, which was also a problem that beleaguered patent juris-
prudence prior to 1982 before Congress created the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.247  The Federal Circuit unified patent law, and the circuit can do 
the same for MDL jurisprudence that concerns federal law.248 
Closing the transitory forum loophole is essential to fairness.  Multidis-
trict litigation lacks integrity when it denies a plaintiff a right or remedy during 
pretrial proceedings that is otherwise available to him after pretrial concludes. 249  
When multiple actions are consolidated for pretrial proceedings, it is nothing 
short of arbitrary that similarly situated plaintiffs across multiple transferor fora 
are treated differently.250  The Federal Circuit can correct this unfairness by 
providing a strictly vertical forum for MDL appeals.  To that end, this Article’s  
proposal charges the Federal Circuit with reviewing pre- and post-JPML orders, 
including appeals after a case is remanded to the transferor court.  This would 
provide certainty as to what law governs in the MDL context and thereby ena-
  
246 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407(e), 1295 (2010). 
247 Id. 
248 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 11. 
249 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  Dworkin uses a checkerboard example to 
show that integrity is in play in our rejection of checkerboard laws.  Id. at 217–18.  Integrity, 
according  to  Dworkin,  “sits  between”  fairness  and  justice.   Id. at 179–180. 
250 See Etelson  v.  Office  of  Pers.  Mgmt.,  684  F.2d  918,  926  (D.C.  Cir.  1982)  (“Government  is  at  
its  most  arbitrary  when  it  treats  similarly  situated  people  differently.”) 
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bles parties to exercise meaningful choice when deciding whether to embark on 
the MDL path. 
By tasking the Federal Circuit to harmonize MDL jurisprudence con-
cerning federal law, the instant proposal enables the circuit to speak further on 
non-patent law and enlarge its non-patent precedent, which the circuit applies to 
the rare patent appeals containing non-patent claims.251  It is naive to think that 
the Federal Circuit has nothing meaningful to say about non-patent law,252 and 
the failure to enable the circuit to  speak  on   issues  outside  patent   law  only  “de-
prives  the  public  of  the  court’s  valuable  expertise.”253  The instant proposal pro-
vides the circuit with an average set of 113 consolidated cases per year from 
which it can exercise interlocutory review254 and an average set of 233 individu-
al actions from which it can exercise final judgment review.255   
Providing the Federal Circuit with broad subject-matter is important to 
reconciling   the   court’s   jurisprudence   with   the   larger realm of decisional law.  
MDL appeals are particularly appropriate for this as they yield searching ques-
tions about, inter alia, environmental law, employment practices, antitrust law, 
economic evidence,256 product liability, and securities fraud.257  This Article’s  
proposal effectively expands the scope of the Federal   Circuit’s   jurisprudence  
and provides the court with a docket that reflects the state of the nationwide 
economy.258  A less specialized docket would present the court with alternative 
  
251 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit's Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Na-
ture And Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 199–200 (2009) (recognizing that the Federal 
Circuit’s  precedent  includes  non-patent law licensing); see Lawler Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Bradley 
Corp., 280 Fed. Appx. 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (interpreting contract law); see also Gugliuzza, 
supra note 110, at 56. 
252 Dreyfuss, supra note 51. 
253 Gugliuzza, supra note 110, at 56. 
254 I determine this number by averaging the number of MDL dockets opened and denied be-
tween 2001 and 2010.  See Annual Statistics of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation: January through December 2010 (2010), JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JPML_Annual_Statistics-CY_2010.pdf. 
255 I determine this number by averaging the number of remands between 2001 through 2010.  
See Annual Statistics of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: January 
through December 2010 (2010), JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JPML_Annual_Statistics-CY_2010.pdf. 
256 See Baye & Write, supra note 164. 
257 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation divides MDLs into ten unique subject-matter 
categories:  “(1)  air;;  (2)  antitrust; (3) contract; (4) common disaster; (5) employment practic-
es; (6) intellectual property; (7) miscellaneous; (8) products liability; (9) sales practices; and 
(10)  securities.”  Fallon  et  al.,  Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2323, 2344 n.89 (2008) (citation omitted). 
258 Dreyfuss, supra note 51. 
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approaches to handling mixed questions of law and fact, which are at the core of 
its costly de novo review of patent claim construction.259  It would provide for 
the circuit a more distinct framework on how patents fit into the economy as a 
whole and thereby make the court more suited to articulate innovation policy in 
its patent cases.260 
2. Remedying Mandamus 
One of the most pressing issues facing the JPML is the lack of meaning-
ful review of transfer and remand orders by way of mandamus.261  The JPML 
frequently issues orders that are replete with conclusory labels and lacking rea-
soned analysis as to why  a  transfer  fulfills  the  statutory  “common  questions  of  
fact,”   “convenience”   of   parties   and   witnesses,   and   “just   and   efficient   con-
duct.”262  This unreasoned analysis contributes  to  the  Panel’s  failure  to  attend  to  
the burdens of displacing litigants via transfer, and time-splitting mandamus 
forecloses meaningful correction by the courts of appeals. 
The  Panel’s   inattention   to   the  burdens  on   litigants   is   troubling  because  
multidistrict litigation presents a David and Goliath scenario for a financially 
distressed plaintiff whose case against a multistate defendant has been trans-
ferred to a forum where it could not have been brought otherwise.  Determina-
tions of preliminary questions of removal and remand are heard by the transfer-
ee district court,263 and the transferee appellate court hears interlocutory review 
of those orders as well as the JPML transfer order.264  The courts of the transfer-
or forum remain powerless unless the case is remanded for trial, which is statis-
tically unlikely to occur.265  This system deprives a plaintiff of his right to trial 
by jury and disrespects the idea that the plaintiff is the master of his com-
plaint.266 
The instant proposal trades time-splitting mandamus for exclusive Fed-
eral Circuit mandamus.  With one court of appeals to advise and supervise the 
JPML,   the  Panel’s  decisions  would  be  subject   to  meaningful  appellate  review.    
  
259 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7,  at  847  (“Conflicts  over  Mixed  Questions  of  Law  and  
Fact”). 
260 See Dreyfuss, supra note 51. 
261 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 21, at 156–57. 
262 Id; 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2010). 
263 See supra text accompanying notes 135–155. 
264 Id. 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 93–107 
266 Id. 
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This leaves less room for the Panel to issue transfer orders lacking reasoned 
analysis in the same way that appellate oversight curbs district courts from de-
parting or varying from the sentencing guidelines without providing specific 
reasons.267 
Conversely, overseeing multidistrict litigation can help the Federal Cir-
cuit to reexamine its selective mandamus practice.268  The first time the circuit 
issued mandamus was in 2008, nearly twenty-five years after its inception.269  Its 
practice is unfair to parties who are properly before a particular district but who 
are transferred away because of the  circuit’s   institutional  bias,  such  as   its  bias  
against the Eastern District of Texas.270  In these instances, mandamus should 
advise district courts on novel points of law and correct abuses below, rather 
than avoiding these issues through selective transfer.271  This Article’s  proposal  
requires the Federal Circuit to issue mandamus to MDL courts when appropriate 
and thereby confront the legal principles underlying general mandamus juris-
prudence.272 
B. Comparing Alternative Reforms 
Until now, legal scholarship has only offered proposals separately ad-
dressing concerns with the Federal Circuit and JPML.  Scholarship like this fails 
to realize that there are legal benefits that result from pairing specialized institu-
tions.  For example, one pre–Lexecon commentator recommends instituting a 
pre-remand hearing at which the Panel would decide whether to consolidate a 
case for trial in the transferee forum, the transferor forum, or another forum. 273  
While this proposal maximizes judicial economy by allowing consolidation of 
multiple cases for trial, it opens a plaintiff, in one legal proceeding, to being 
  
267 See Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The 
Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing 1, 22 (Va. Public Law & Legal Theory Research, 
Working Paper No. 2010-23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434123  (“We  conclude  
that  district  judges  are  meaningfully  constrained  by  the  prospect  of  appellate  reversal.”) 
268 See supra note 207–14. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 See Gugliuzza, supra note 110, at 7. 
272 Id. 
273 Blake M. Rhodes, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. 
L. REV. 711, 745 (1991). 
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subject to the varied interpretations of federal law in four horizontal fora.274  It 
disregards the procedural unfairness of appealing an adverse decision to multi-
ple fora, and it aggravates tensions between the choice of law and the law of the 
case doctrines when two or more appellate courts review decisions below.  By 
providing a single appellate forum, the instant proposal closes the transitory 
forum loophole that this commentator’s  proposal exacerbates.275 
In contrast to this idea of a pre-remand hearing, Professor Robert 
Ragazzo, a law professor at the University of Houston, suggests applying the 
federal law of each transferor forum in multidistrict litigation.276  While 
Ragazzo’s  solution  does  a  better  job  of  promoting   fairness for plaintiffs, it pre-
sents an especially perplexing process for a transferee judge when one or more 
transferor circuits have not spoken on ambiguous federal law, which is theoreti-
cally uniform nationwide, and the transferee judge must interpret that law.277  
Notwithstanding ambiguous federal law, interlocutory review, under Ragazzo’s  
proposal, remains nothing more than an expensive dress rehearsal when the 
transferee circuit is not the transferor circuit, as the one or more transferor cir-
cuits (aside from the Supreme Court) are the final expositors of transferor law.  
By providing a single set of Federal Circuit precedent, this Article’s  proposal  
eliminates review of a transferee ruling by two fora in one legal proceeding and 
the sophistry associated with a transferee judge interpreting ambiguous federal 
law. 
With respect to remedying the Federal Circuit, Professors Craig Nard, a 
law professor at Marquette University, and John Duffy, a law professor at 
George Washington University, suggest duplicating specialty appellate courts 
across the country.278  While their proposal promotes the regional percolation of 
  
274 This assumes that each of the following fora reside in different circuits: (1) the transferor 
forum,  (2) the forum where the pre-transfer hearing is held, (3) the transferee forum, and (4) 
the trial forum. 
275 Id. 
276 Ragazzo, supra note 38, at 768–69. 
277 See In  re  Korean  Air  Lines,  829  F.2d  at  1183  (Ginsburg,  J.,  concurring)  (“As  a  result,  any  
attempt by Chief Judge Robinson to predict how the First and Sixth Circuits would interpret 
the Warsaw Convention on this precise point would necessitate casuistical musings concern-
ing  whether  another  circuit’s  case  law  might  be  read  to  compel,  or  even  perhaps  just  to  sug-
gest, an interpretation in conflict with his. Such intellectual practices fall within the domain 
of   the   sophist,   not   that   of   the   judge.”);;   cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) 
(holding that the Kansas Supreme Court did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause or 
the Due Process Clause by construing that the laws of Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana were 
coextensive with Kansas law). 
278 Nard & Duffy, supra note 237, 1647 (proposing that multiple extant circuits hear patent 
appeals). 
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patent law, it is likely to multiply the existing problems facing the Federal Cir-
cuit across the country.  On the other hand, this Article’s  proposal  provides  the  
Federal Circuit a multidistrict litigation docket that reflects the state of the na-
tional economy.279  By expanding the   Federal   Circuit’s   jurisdiction   into   the  
realm of more general appeals, the instant proposal internally seeks to correct 
the lack of diversity in patent law that Nard and Duffy condemn without dupli-
cating  the  Federal  Circuit’s  challenges  nationwide. 
While these alternative approaches have their own advantages, none of 
them addresses the collective unfairness of the  JPML’s  transfer  process and its 
isolation from the Federal Circuit.  This Article’s  proposal  integrates  specialized  
institutions in ways that improve each of them. 
C. Evaluating This Proposal 
While this Article’s proposal charges the Federal Circuit with harmoniz-
ing more federal law, it does not suggest that the court harmonize the law of 
other  circuits.    Rather,  the  present  proposal  limits  the  Federal  Circuit’s  new  au-
thority to deciding questions of federal law arising from its exclusive jurisdic-
tion over MDL appeals.  This proposal also allows the circuit to borrow ideas 
from  any  source,  including  those  provided  by  other  circuits’  laws,  foreign   law,  
and non-legal literature.  It both expands the set of Federal Circuit precedents 
and the overall set of precedents of the courts of appeals.  This promotes diversi-
fied decision-making,280 which provides the Supreme Court with the benefit of 
more  circuits’  views  before  making  nationwide  policy.281  Having the option to 
choose the fittest out of many rules, in theory, leads to better law.282 
While this proposal trades one set of precedents for another, it replaces 
horizontal precedent with vertical, coherent sui generis precedent that binds the 
JPML and MDL courts.  An examination of In re Korean Air Lines shows that 
interpretations of ambiguous federal law vary among the circuits and that ad hoc 
decision-making determines whether transferor law applies in the transferee 
forum.283  Each  circuit’s  choice  of  law  decisions do not bind MDL courts outside 
  
279 See Fallon, supra note 257. 
280 Jeremy T. Grabill, Comment, Multistate Class Actions Properly Frustrated by Choice-of-
Law Complexities: The Role of Parallel Litigation in the Courts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 299 (2005). 
281 See id; but see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1590 (2008) 
(recognizing that variations in interpretation of federal law are not always worth correcting, 
and in some cases may reflect regional preferences). 
282 See Grabill, supra note 280, at 299. 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 135–155. 
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a particular circuit, and transferee and transferor courts typically sit in separate 
circuits   and  are   thus   not   subject   to   each   other’s   interpretations   of   federal   law.    
Likewise,  the  JPML’s  placement  in  the  federal  court  system means that no cir-
cuit’s  precedent  binds  JPML  decisions.    Under  this  Article’s  proposal,  uniform 
federal precedent applies to all litigants haled into multidistrict litigation and 
thereby places these litigants on equal footing.  Instead of one set of precedents 
being applied in the transferee forum and a second set (or more) being applied 
on remand, the instant proposal creates a single superset of vertical precedents. 
V.         CONCLUSION 
The JPML and the Federal Circuit represent congressional experiments 
within the judicial system.  Both the 1967 Coordinating Committee and the 
1973  Hruska  Commission  were  aimed  at  promoting  the  “just,  speedy,  and  inex-
pensive  determination”  of   litigation  issues.284  Since their inceptions, the JPML 
and Federal Circuit have been (and continue to be) relatively successful in ex-
pediting issue resolution.285  Patents have been reviewed and upheld more fre-
quently than during the pre-Federal Circuit era,286 and the JPML has effectuated 
dispositions or settlements in roughly seventy-six percent of the cases it has 
transferred.287  However, the ideals of individualized justice and inexpensive 
resolution of individual cases have been sacrificed for the sake of macro-level 
economy.288  The pairing of these two institutions would be beneficial for pro-
moting undeniably necessary institutional reform. 
The JPML can benefit from the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit has 
valuable expertise unifying federal law and overseeing district court cases in-
volving patents nationwide.  The JPML can benefit from oversight by a single, 
federal appellate court and the resultant elimination of time-splitting mandamus 
that deprives the Panel of supervision and advice.  Oversight by a specialized 
court of appeals having nationwide jurisdiction would unify MDL jurisprudence 
and thereby close the transitory forum loophole, eliminating the unfairness and 
costliness that emanate from a party being temporally subject to the non-
uniform laws of two fora in a single legal proceeding. 
The Federal Circuit can benefit from the JPML.  Multidistrict litigation 
represents a rich source of diverse subject matter that reflects a broad 
  
284 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (2010). 
285 See supra text accompanying notes 8–19. 
286 See Merges, supra note 13. 
287 See supra text accompanying note 96. 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 147–206. 
File: Nofal - Final - Post Proof - NEW 12.27 Created on:  12/3/2012 8:53:00 PM Last Printed: 12/29/2012 5:46:00 PM 
416 IDEA—The Intellectual Property Law Review  
52 IDEA 3 (2012) 
cross-section of the nationwide economy.   JPML and MDL jurisprudence ex-
hausts complex issues of transfer, remand, and mandamus.  The Federal Circuit 
can benefit from an infusion of generalist appeals that present alternatives to its 
unfair selective mandamus practice and its costly handling of hybrid questions.  
Generalist appeals would allow the Federal Circuit to see more clearly the legal 
principles in patent law and the effects that intellectual property has on the over-
all economy, making the circuit better suited to adjudicate patents with fairness, 
integrity, and consequence sensitivity. 
To these ends, this Article has proposed vesting in the Federal Circuit 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over multidistrict litigation.  The Federal Circuit 
and   the   JPML  can  benefit   from   one  another   and   together   remedy   each  other’s  
complex, institutional challenges. 
 
